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There are certain aspects of analytical aesthetics that, over the years, I 
have increasingly come to see as problematic: its insufficient concern for 
relevant empirical facts, its tendency to objectivize concepts, and its ten-
dency to believe in the existence of privileged perspectives on the world. 
In this paper, I will illustrate and discuss these features, drawing my ex-
amples from three publications by prominent exponents of analytical 
aesthetics: Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen’s Truth, Fiction, and 
Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (1994), Jerrold Levinson’s “Extend-
ing Art Historically” (1993), and Noël Carroll’s “Art and Human Nature” 
(2004). Although I will comment on some of the theses explicitly advo-
cated in the three contributions – which are all concerned with the con-
cepts of literature or of art – my main focus will be on what they do not 
mention, on what I consider to be some of their blind spots.
My claim that the three alleged weaknesses are frequently to be found 
in analytical aesthetics cannot really be substantiated within the confines 
of a single article. I will, however, be more than satisfied if I am able to 
convince some analytical aestheticians that these three features are in fact 
problematic. That, rather than the question of how widespread they are, is 
probably the really contentious issue.
II
In Truth, Fiction, and Literature, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen 
describe the reading of literature as a practice governed by a set of con-
ventions. They write:
Adopting the literary stance towards a text is to identify it as a literary work 
and apprehend it in accordance with the conventions of the literary practice. 
The mode of apprehension which the practice defines is one of appreciation. 
The literary stance is defined by the expectation of (and consequently the at-
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tempt to identify) a certain type of value, i.e. literary aesthetic value, in the text 
in question.1
The authors describe literary works as, ideally, capable of affording liter-
ary aesthetic value. In their opinion, reading literature in accordance with 
the conventions of the literary practice is to seek to identify and benefit 
from the literary aesthetic value of the text. “Aesthetic” is to be under-
stood, here, in a narrow and specific sense: Lamarque and Olsen defend 
the idea of the autonomy of literature and deny that literary appreciation 
includes the forming of beliefs about the world outside the text.2
Personally, I do not subscribe to Lamarque and Olsen’s analysis of the 
conventions of the literary practice. However, in the present context it is 
one of their implicit methodological suppositions that is at issue, rather 
than the substance of their account. Lamarque and Olsen offer their char-
acterization of the literary stance without citing any empirical evidence 
in its favour – as a reader of their book, one gains the impression that 
their basis is their own inside knowledge of the practice and philosophi-
cal reflection. It is as if empirical evidence about the attitudes actually 
adopted by readers of literature were superfluous – but an account of the 
conventions of the literary practice cannot very well be independent of 
facts about how the practice is actually performed. 
In empirical investigations into the reading of literature, readers are 
sometimes invited to indicate what kinds of satisfaction they seek in lit-
erature. For instance, in 2001, Michael Charlton and his associates carried 
out an extensive investigation of German novel readers (1,025 intervie-
wees).3 At one point in the interviews, the subjects were asked “For what 
reasons do you read novels? Do you read novels …” and were offered eight 
possible grounds which they could mention or not mention as relevant 
in their own case. (They were also allowed to add further reasons of their 
own or to say that they did not know.4) The eight grounds, and the per-
centages of positive answers (that is, of mentions), were as follows:5
To entertain yourself    75.2 %
To relax     74.5 %
To do something for your all-round education 63.7 %
Because the theme gives impulses to reflection 58.0 %
Because you enjoy the style of the author  58.0 %
To learn something about people  57.9 %
To be transported into another world  51.1 %
To be able to talk with others about them  43.9 %
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Largely compatible results were obtained in Hintzenberger, Schmidt, 
and Zobel’s West German investigation from 1978–79, and in a Norwe-
gian study by Jofrid Karner Smidt published in 2002.6
It is true that “To enjoy the autonomous literary-aesthetic value of the 
work” was not on Charlton’s list. Nevertheless, the outcome appears dif-
ficult to reconcile with the idea that readers of literature concentrate on 
appreciation in Lamarque and Olsen’s sense: that would be inconsistent 
with the role seemingly played by pure entertainment (“entertain your-
self”, “relax”) and by learning from literature (“education”, “learn some-
thing”).
No pre-established alternatives were used in the pilot study for an inves-
tigation by H.W.J. Miesen, finally reported in 2003. Miesen elicited beliefs 
about the reading of novels from 33 visitors to a local Dutch library. He 
used a questionnaire and submitted the answers given to content analy-
sis. According to Miesen’s subjects, their main reasons for reading litera-
ture were (as categorized by Miesen, and listed here in random order):
To experience feelings of beauty
To stimulate one’s imagination
To be surprised
To entertain oneself
To learn more about others
To get a different view of things
To sharpen one’s intellectual capacity
To read real-life stories
To have a clear view of how to live7
Seemingly, a kind of aesthetic motive in a narrow sense is present in Mies-
en’s subjects (“experience feelings of beauty”), just as it was in Charlton’s 
study (“enjoy the style of the author”). However, most of the reasons men-
tioned are of entirely different kinds.
Judging by the results just reviewed, readers of literature do not, on the 
whole, adopt the attitude that Lamarque and Olsen characterize as the 
literary stance. To a large extent, they appear to be looking for such things 
as sheer enjoyment, knowledge of the world, enhancement of their intel-
lectual capacities, and understanding of other people and of themselves. 
These empirical results may naturally be relativized, or even questioned, 
on various grounds. On the other hand, Lamarque and Olsen’s view is 
entirely without systematic empirical support of any kind.
Clearly, the empirical investigations do not in themselves disprove La-
marque and Olsen’s statements. Lamarque and Olsen wish to character-
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ize the conventions of the literary practice, and such an undertaking will 
inevitably involve a measure of idealization, perhaps also a measure of 
normativity. Yet, as I pointed out earlier, it is difficult to see how one 
can simply neglect, in giving an account of literary practice, how readers 
actually read literature. Compare, for instance, an account of the gram-
matical conventions of English. It would not be a simple reflection of how 
speakers and writers of the language express themselves, for many actual 
utterances will no doubt be considered ungrammatical, and for good rea-
sons. But such an account cannot cut all ties with actual usage either, for 
it would become idiosyncratic and counterproductive if the purported 
grammatical conventions were not in fact followed, more or less, in lin-
guistic utterances considered fully acceptable within the community of 
native English speakers. 
For that reason I find it a crucial shortcoming in Lamarque and Olsen 
that they make no attempt to substantiate the tenability of their account 
of the literary practice through reference to empirical findings. They do 
not even seem to think of empirical evidence as something that is miss-
ing from their argument, something that, for example, they hope will be 
forthcoming eventually, through their own efforts or through those of 
other researchers. 
Their silence on this point would have been understandable if it had 
been evident and generally known that the attitude they describe as the 
literary stance is indeed the stance adopted by readers of literature: that 
these are more or less invariably concentrated on deriving autonomous 
literary-aesthetic value from their acts of reading. However, the brief look 
at some empirical studies of readers’ motivation must at least be said to 
demonstrate that such an assumption is highly contestable. Hence, to me, 
the characterization of the literary stance in Truth, Fiction, and Literature 
is a pertinent example of the insufficient concern for the empirical – for 
empirical circumstances that can be reasonably supposed to be relevant 
to the philosophical argument – that I often find in analytical aesthetics.
III
I now turn to the objectivizing of concepts, which I will exemplify with 
the help of Jerrold Levinson’s “Extending Art Historically”, one of the es-
says in which Levinson explains and defends his so-called historical defi-
nition of art. For my purposes, it will not be necessary to discuss the actual 
content of the definition. What interests me here are some of Levinson’s 
general intuitions about the concept of art. 
As is well known from works such as Paul Kristeller’s “The Modern 
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System of the Arts” (1951–52) or, much more recently, Larry Shiner’s 
The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (2001),8 concepts such as ‘art’, ‘lit-
erature’, et cetera in something like their modern shape emerged, very 
broadly speaking, in the course of the 18th century. Levinson notes that 
the concept of art has passed through a number of historical changes. 
In the essay, however, he concentrates on our current generic concept 
of art, “the most general concept of art that we have now, one that seems 
adequate to the art of today but can also be seen to comprehend all that 
its predecessors did as well, that is to say, all the art of our past that has 
ever been recognized as such”.9 He specifies how he prefers to define that 
concept, and then goes on to explain why the concept may also be applied 
to earlier periods.
It is natural to ask at this point what concept of art it is that I have taken myself 
to have plumbed, or to put the question in its usual, accusatory form, whose? 
Bearing in mind that it is the descriptive or classificatory idea of art that is in 
question, and not any of its honorific or polemical relatives, my largely unapolo-
getic answer to this is that it is, naturally enough, our concept – the Western, 
Renaissance-derived notion whose current state of evolution I was trying to 
understand … Our concept of art, the one we standardly work with and pre-
suppose in enlightened and informed contemporary discourse about it, is one 
we undoubtedly and properly apply outside the historical and cultural sphere 
in which it was forged … To put this more pithily, if another culture has art, it 
must have art in our sense, more or less – whatever the inevitable differences 
between its art and ours in terms of materials, structure, expressiveness, ritual-
embeddedness, object-orientedness, and so on. Otherwise the claim, assuming 
we have not switched languages, has no clear content.10 
I agree with Levinson that a contemporary concept of art may in principle 
also be applied to other times and cultures than our own. My reservations 
concerning his formulations refer to two other, underlying issues, not ex-
plicitly addressed by Levinson.
First, the idea that we have, today, a common concept of art (“[o]ur con-
cept of art”) is introduced and taken for granted without factual corrobor-
ation, although it is absolutely fundamental to Levinson’s argument in 
the article. As in Lamarque and Olsen, I miss any reference to relevant 
empirical circumstances, in Levinson’s case: to the contemporary use of 
the word “art” and to its functions. In my view, the supposition that there 
is a common concept of art cannot very well be true independently of 
how people actually think and speak of art.
When elaborating on this, let me first comment on our concept(s) of 
Three Problematical Aspects of Analytical Aesthetics
65
literature.11 There is an everyday use of the word “literature”, reflected 
in such sources as dictionaries. Actually, the word has several meanings, 
but one could say that there is an everyday concept of literature as an art 
which we all share, “our concept of literature”. Webster defines it as “writ-
ings in prose or verse; esp: writings having excellence of form or expres-
sion and expressing ideas of permanent or universal interest”.12
Obviously, however, this communal concept of literature is vague and 
general. Often we use more precise concepts also labelled “literature”, 
concepts that make the more specialized distinctions we need in various 
circumstances. This is true of “literature” as used in a number of different 
historical and systematic contexts within academic literary studies, and of 
“literature” in certain more specialized non-academic usages: in connec-
tion with library classification, in connection with the Nobel Prize in Lit-
erature, et cetera. Arguably, these more specialized concepts of literature 
– mutually different and associated with mutually incompatible require-
ments on the content of the concept – fulfil their respective, worthwhile 
functions and are all legitimate.
It is consequently not possible to speak of “our concept of literature” as 
a single, definite concept, the one we standardly work with and presup-
pose in enlightened and informed contemporary discourse about it. It 
also appears difficult to deny that the same must apply to our concept 
of art, particularly since literature, and the multiplicity of literature just 
described, de facto falls under the generic concept of art that Levinson has 
in mind. There is certainly a shared, everyday concept of art, something 
that “art” means as a part of the English language; The American Heritage 
Dictionary defines it as “human works of beauty considered as a group”.13 
That vague and general everyday concept will however probably be of 
little value in serious discussions of the arts, and will not be the one that 
we use in such demanding contexts.
The idea of human works of beauty considered as a group would, in 
reality, have to be sharpened and refined considerably if we were to create 
interesting groupings and generalizations with its help, and such sharpen-
ing and refining is something which can only be done by means of stipu-
lation. Stipulation, however, must be performed with some more specific 
aim in mind if it is not to be wholly arbitrary. This makes it doubtful that 
one could construe a unified concept of art that would be worth having, 
because of the multitude of purposes that the concept, or concepts, of art 
probably serves in enlightened and informed contemporary discourse.
The phrase “worth having” is important here. Construing concepts is 
easy enough, but construing concepts worth having is not. For me, worth-
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while concepts are those which successfully fulfil significant purposes. I 
believe in conceptual relativity, as John Searle defines it when he writes 
that “[s]ystems of representation, such as vocabularies and conceptual 
schemes generally, are human creations, and to that extent arbitrary. It 
is possible to have any number of different systems of representations 
for representing the same reality.”14 According to this view, the concept of 
art is a human construct. I take that to mean that, like other human con-
structs, it can be expected to serve a purpose (or else it will be purposeless 
and can be discarded).15 We may ask ourselves what purpose or purposes 
it serves, and how well it performs.
As already intimated, my critical reflections about Levinson’s remarks 
about the concept of art can be said to have paralleled my reservations 
towards Lamarque and Olsen’s characterization of the literary stance. In 
both cases, I objected to the scant attention to relevant empirical fact: to 
actual literary practice, and to the actual employment of the word “art” 
among scholars, theorists, critics, and people in general. But perhaps La-
marque, Olsen, and Levinson would not, in effect, find my empirical delib-
erations relevant? Perhaps Lamarque and Olsen, in analysing the nature 
of the literary practice, do not conceive of themselves as obliged to take 
account of what readers of literature actually do and value? And perhaps 
Levinson does not regard his reflections about the concept of art as be-
ing restricted by considerations of how people – laypersons and various 
kinds of professionals – actually think and talk about what they call “art”? 
Perhaps Lamarque, Olsen, and Levinson all regard themselves as engaged 
in purely conceptual investigations?
I believe that this is a distinct possibility. Yet it seems to me that a pure-
ly conceptual investigation, liberated from concerns about how the cor-
responding words and ideas are employed by the community of speakers 
and writers of the language, will presuppose a special view of concepts. 
Concepts will have to be conceived of as enjoying a kind of existence that 
is – like that of material reality – ultimately independent of human con-
ventions and symbolizations.
It is to such attitudes to concepts – common in analytical aesthetics 
–16 that I refer when I talk of objectivizing concepts. To concentrate on 
Levinson: I would say that he objectivizes the concept of art, implicitly 
portraying it as having some unexplained kind of existence independent 
of human minds and human conventions – and, of course, as being of 
unquestionable importance as a category of thought. I find this position 
problematic and even hard to comprehend. I would listen with interest to 
explanations from Levinson of how and where the concept of art exists 
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according to him, and of the means by which we can gain knowledge of 
its contents. The same goes for Lamarque and Olsen and the idea of the 
literary practice.
IV
There are inner connections between the three problematic features of 
which I am speaking: the insufficient concern for relevant empirical facts 
(or the denial of the relevance of the facts in question), the tendency to 
objectivize concepts, and the tendency to believe in the existence of privi-
leged perspectives on the world. The objectivizing of concepts is perhaps 
the key factor. If concepts are there – in a deeper sense than the one that 
people have already created a multitude of concepts which we are, in prin-
ciple, free to reject or remodel – then it seems that conceptual relativity 
cannot really be in force. Concepts cannot be to some extent arbitrary, at 
least not the genuinely important concepts, and it will not be possible to 
have any number of different, defensible systems of representation for 
representing the same reality. There will be representations of the world 
couched in the right concepts; there will be the right take on the world, the 
privileged perspective on it. Further, if grasping the content of the right 
concepts is what matters, rational reflection, not empirical investigation, 
may seem to be what is called for.
The close relationship between belief in non-relative concepts and in 
the right take on the world is, I think, perceptible in Levinson’s essay. 
I will however attempt to illustrate it further by aid of a third and last 
textual example: Noël Carroll’s article “Art and Human Nature” (2004),17 
where Carroll argues that art is universal and is explainable through refer-
ence to a common cause. 
Carroll notes that some object to this idea on the premise that many 
other cultures lack the concept of art, 
or, at least, that their concepts are so wildly different from the Western con-
cept that they mark different phenomena. That is, once we recognize that the 
concepts that underwrite different artistic practices in different cultures are 
wildly nonconverging, we will realize that the phenomena we boldly suppose 
belong to the same class – and for that reason, we say, call for the same explana-
tion – are really only a series of disjunct practices, best explained culturally and 
historically with attention to local detail, rather than something global, like our 
purportedly common humanity.18
Carroll does not tell us explicitly who the advocates of such divergent 
opinions are. He suggests, however, that the counter-arguments against 
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his standpoint focus on the role of disinterested contemplation in the 
Western conception of art. Then he points out that the view of artworks 
“as things designed for disinterested, nonutilitarian contemplation” is in 
fact controversial within Western culture, and that the Western concept 
of art is broader and more diversified than that; for instance, there is much 
religious or political Western art. “In short,” he concludes, “those who com-
plain that other cultures do not share our concept of art and, therefore, 
that art, so-called, is not universal err because they take an impoverished 
view of what counts and has counted as art in Western culture.”19
Carroll is in fact not content to argue that art is universal. He goes one 
step further, and maintains that other cultures share our concept of art. 
That was already implicit in the last quotation, but Carroll also states ex-
plicitly that “our operative conception of art coincides approximately to 
what we find elsewhere in other cultures”.20 This is a further step, since the 
question of whether art in our sense is universal should not be confused 
with the question of whether other cultures share our concept of art. The 
art may be there, so to speak, according to our definition, but it may still 
clearly be the case that the other culture thinks differently than we do 
about the phenomena that we define as their art.21
Carroll defends the idea that other times and cultures share our concept 
of art basically by pointing out that the view of art as disinterested is not 
the only one in the Western tradition, and, conversely, that art serving 
religious or political purposes is also well known in the Western tradition. 
In my opinion, such a way of proceeding can never get us very far. What 
Carroll proves, if his facts are correct, is that there are similarities between 
some Western views of art and several other conceptualizations. I find it 
difficult to see how he gets from such observations to the conclusion that 
other cultures share our concept of art.
The question of whether or not other times and cultures share our 
present concept of art is, to a large extent, an empirical one.22 We can go 
through times and cultures and ask how they conceptualized the phe-
nomena that we would like to classify as art. Then we can compare their 
conceptualizations with our concept of art, however we want to define 
it, and assess similarities and differences. This is precisely what Shiner 
did for the Western tradition from Antiquity up to today in The Inven­
tion of Art. In his view, older Western culture did not have our concept 
of art, hence the title of his book, but of course one may dispute Shiner’s 
empirical findings and, regardless of empirical facts, one may disagree 
about whether two conceptualizations represent “the same” or “different” 
concepts. 
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I am not in a position to say much about conceptualizations of non-
literary artistic phenomena in other cultures than our own, but I have at 
least some familiarity with the situation in the literary field. 23 Before the 
modern period, in cultures with writing such as the classical Chinese, In-
dian, Western, et cetera, some texts were regarded as being of general cul-
tural importance, other texts as being specialist texts ( for example, texts 
about medicine or about warfare), and still other texts were seen as repre-
senting trivial entertainment. Fiction was typically understood as trivial 
entertainment, and poetry as being of general cultural importance.
There were many concepts of genres and of types of text, but, as far 
as I know, no concepts closely resembling the modern concept of litera-
ture. In Western culture, the concept of poetry is no doubt the one that is 
most similar, but there are nevertheless important differences between 
the traditional concept of poetry and the modern concept of literature.24 
Consequently, it is hard to see how one could successfully maintain that 
other cultures, including older Western culture, shared our concept of 
literature, despite the fact that those cultures had texts that we would 
now normally call literary. Since literature is an important part of art in 
the generic sense, this circumstance should already cast doubt on the idea 
that the other cultures shared what Carroll, like Levinson, refers to as “our 
concept of art”.25
It is not really Carroll’s conclusion, however, but his attitude to the phe-
nomena discussed that is of interest for the theme of my present paper. 
Carroll does not, like Shiner and myself, show any interest in providing a 
unified exposition of how any other time or any other culture talked and 
thought about the phenomena in question. Thus he allows no perspective 
other than the one he calls the Western concept of art to emerge before 
his reader. Disconnected elements from other outlooks are introduced, 
but never the full perspectives which I would like to see compared with 
the Western conceptualizations.
I would say that Carroll by reasoning in this fashion not only effectively 
disregards the way in which other times and cultures viewed what we call 
their art, but that he also fosters the impression that our present concept 
of art provides the only valid perspective on the phenomena in question. 
It is not as if those phenomena could be viewed and described from many 
angles and for many purposes, each perspective bringing some interest-
ing features to the fore while hiding or obscuring others. Carroll proceeds, 
I would say, as if our concept of art, or what he chooses to define as our 
concept of art, provided a privileged perspective on the phenomena.
This is combined with objectivizing the concept of art. Note, for ex-
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ample, Carroll’s words about artworks or artistic practices as “phenomena 
we boldly suppose to belong to the same class – and for that reason, we 
say, call for the same explanation”. Here, Carroll expresses himself as if 
classes exist independently of human conventions and as if we can make 
suppositions, correct or incorrect, about their membership. To me, classes 
are human constructs, like all conceptual phenomena – things that are 
created, not found, except of course in the sense that many classes have 
already been constructed and are already in cultural existence, for us to 
use, discard, or remake.
Like Levinson, Carroll asserts that the Western concept of art can be 
applied to cultures other than our own,26 but he also maintains that art 
is universal. The criteria for classifying something as art suggested by 
Carroll are relatively loose. He says that “there are certain very frequently 
recurring features in a great deal of what are called artworks across cul-
tures, including their embodiment in a sensuous medium that calls for an 
imaginative response to their decorative, representational, emotive, and 
symbolic properties” and adds that “these things are typically the product 
of the application of skills, acquired from a tradition, and they address 
both feeling and cognition, often affording pleasure”. 27 For my part, being 
a conceptual relativist, I would say that whether or not art will emerge as 
universal partly depends on how you define “art”. That will be a question 
not only of what exists in cultural reality but also of how you choose to 
represent it. In a definition built around Carroll’s criteria, art would in-
deed probably turn out to be universal. A more interesting question to 
me, however, is why this should be considered a fruitful way of construct-
ing the concept of art.
Carroll says nothing about that latter question, probably because he 
views the whole matter differently. When he discusses whether or not art 
is universal, I get the impression that he thinks of this almost as being a 
question of fact, as if there are things that simply are art, and that the the-
sis of their universal occurrence can be verified or falsified. He does not 
seem to believe that there are merely things which we call art, for reasons 
whose respectability can always, in principle, be questioned.
V
Before concluding, I would like to add three reservations or supplemen-
tary comments.
Firstly, each specimen of analytical aesthetics is naturally different and 
will have to be judged on its own merits. I certainly do not pretend to 
have described features that can be found everywhere in the tradition. 
Three Problematical Aspects of Analytical Aesthetics
71
Yet I believe that the phenomena which I have discussed are relatively 
widespread – the list of examples could easily have been made quite ex-
tensive – and the authors discussed are some of the best-known thinkers 
in the field.
Secondly, I do not wish to claim that my observations are very origi-
nal. For instance, in his article “Why Philosophy of Art Cannot Handle 
Kissing, Touching, and Crying” (2003) Nicholas Wolterstorff criticizes 
analytical philosophy basically for what I have called its objectivizing of 
concepts and its belief in privileged perspectives on the world.28 He em-
phasizes the lack of reflexivity found in analytical philosophy, its lack of 
awareness of the fact that a work of philosophy represents an interven-
tion in reality, performed from a certain perspective and in a given his-
torical situation. Wolterstorff writes that the “analytical philosopher talks 
and acts as if the questions he asks, concerning the analysis of concepts 
and the entailments among propositions, were located in some Platonic 
heaven of philosophical problems” and that analytical philosophers “typi-
cally … do not reflect on why they … ask the questions they do ask and 
use the concepts they do use. They are unreflective about their own intel-
lectual, social, and political location. They are that because they do not 
think it is relevant. Philosophy, if done properly, is not perspectival but 
objective; it tells how things look from nowhere.”29
Third, and lastly: though I have said a good deal about aspects that I 
find problematic, my paper is certainly motivated by a positive interest in 
analytical aesthetics. My own area of specialization is something I usually 
call fundamental literary theory, and I have learned much from analytical 
aesthetics, decade after decade. Unlike the majority of theorists within lit-
erary studies, which is my own subject, most analytical aestheticians have 
a genuine theoretical interest in the overall functioning and the poss ible 
value of what we vaguely refer to as literature. In addition, the average 
analytical aesthetician also has much greater technical competence than 
the average literary theorist when it comes to handling abstractions and 
organizing ideas and statements into coherent arguments. For these and 
other reasons, the future of analytical aesthetics is important to me. Fur-
thermore I cannot actually see how the reforms that I implicitly argue 
for could be alien to its nature. People like John Searle, Larry Shiner, and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff can be said to speak, to a greater or lesser extent, 
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